Several researchers have published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin, and are asking the wider community to look for flaws in it. Researcher Mikhail Kudinov announced the first version Thursday in a thread on X, saying the paper reduces SHRINCS’ security to the properties of its underlying hash function.
The analysis, dated Nov. 18, estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though those figures rest on assumptions that include three unproven conjectures. Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still working on a new analysis of a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has so far been conjectured, and on tightening a reprogramming step and improving a bound against quantum attackers.
How SHRINCS works
SHRINCS is a hash-based scheme, meaning its security rests on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve math behind today’s Bitcoin signatures. It places two designs under one key: a stateful part built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA. Because both use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the proof has to cover both.
Signature size is the main cost. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures typically come in around 71. Signatures take up scarce block space, so larger ones mean fewer transactions per block.
The risk of a stateful signature
The compact stateful path carries a danger. It relies on one-time keys, and if a wallet accidentally reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal the funds. Wallet software therefore has to track the state of every key. The stateless path avoids the problem, but at a much larger size.
Jonas Nick, Blockstream’s director of research, told Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation, on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically fall back to the stateless path whenever a state counter could be compromised. “It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” he said. “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.”
Nick also warned that heavy use of the larger signatures would weigh on the network. “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” he said. “And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin.”
Researchers ask for review
The authors are clear that the analysis needs scrutiny. Kudinov said it has not been sufficiently peer reviewed, and the project’s GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. “We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes,” he wrote, asking readers to open an issue if they find one.
The team also produced two results that are not specific to SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov said they also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the hash-based schemes SHRINCS borrows from, and that they were published as separate papers.
The SHRINCS work lands as quantum risk climbs the agenda. A global securities regulators’ group this week warned that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially hard, and researchers recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network after Bitcoin’s first quantum-safe transaction was shown without a fork.
The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS is also open for comment. “We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers,” Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, said of it. “There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise.”

